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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
H. WILLIAM NALDER, CATHERINE
NALDER AND H. WILLIAM NALDER,

JR.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
Case
No. 8313

vs.

KELLOGG SALES COMPANY,
a corporation,

Defendant and Appellant,

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

ARGUMENT
In their petition for rehearing respondents complain of this court's ruling that when penalties of differing
severity may possibly be applied only the least or lesser
penalty provided by law will be given application. While
respondents challenge the correctness of such ruling they
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confess their inability to cite any authority in support of
their position.
All damages assessed by the lower court in excess of
actual damages were true penalties and being punitive in
their nature they are clearly akin to penalties imposed for
the violation of criminal statutes or ordinances.
The cases hold, in harmony with this court's decision,
that when there is uncertainty or doubt as to which of
two penalties may be imposed the accused is entitled to the
imposition of the lesser penalty.
In People v. Hoaglin, 247 N. W. 141, 144, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that:
uif any uncertainty develops as to which penal
clause is applicable, the accused is entitled to have
the lesser of two penal ties administered."
See also, People v. Lockhart, 219 N. W. 724.
The Michigan cases and the decision of this court are
in harmony with each other and with the accepted legal
philosophy that statutes prescribing penalties are strictly
construed in favor of persons accused of violation.
Except for the foregoing all matters referred to in
respondents' petition were fully covered by the briefs and
oral argument.
The petition for rehearing should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
and ALBERT R. BOWEN
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

State of Utah,
· Plaintiff,
Oase No. 8314

vs.
CLARENCE E. BRIDGE,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
ON APPEAL

STATB~fE~T

OF FACTS

DEFENDANT \Yas charged with the crime of
robbery, to-wit: on or about the 19th day of April,.
1D;-)4, robbing one Edna Brennan in her residence l,ocated
at 23 ~ orth 1st \V(•st, Salt Lake Cit~·, State of Ut~ah .
.:\eromplices mimed in the complaint were Herbert
Schlos·ser and :\f•ilton B. Head, the former having pleaded
"guilty" to the charge and the latter ha ,·ing been conYicted after a trial by jur.'··
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On the 28th day of October, 1954, the defendant
was placed on trial in the Third Judicial District Court
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Clarence'
E. Baker presiding. From his conviction hy the jury
and the imposed sentence this 'appeal is taken. Discussion
of the evidence so far as it relate,;; to the questions whi<'h
this appeal raises will be n1ade as the various matters
upon which appellant relies are discussed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
The argument in this case will rollow the point
below given:
POINT J.
That the Oourt below committeed error in denying
defendan ts objection to the introduction of a confession
made by defendant to the Salt Lake City police, subsequent to his arrest and while being held in the Salt
Lake City jail (Tr. 15), and, that this error is inevHably
linked ·with the trial courts subsequent refusal to grant
defendants motion for dismis'sal (Tr. 39) on the grounds
of denial of counsel and on the related grounds of the
use of uncorroborated testimony of an ac0omplice on
which to sustain a conviction.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
''That the Court below committed error in denying
defendants qbjection to the introduction of a confession
made by defendant to the Salt Lake Cit~' police, subsequent to his arrest and while being held in the Salt
Lake City jail (Tr. 15), and, that this error is inevitably
linked with the trial courts subsequent refusal to grant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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def~ndants

motion for dismissal (Tr. 39) on the grounds
of denial of -counsel and on the related grounds of the
use of ~ncorroborated testimony of an aceomplice on
which to sustain a convietion. ''

It is the contention of defendant that Se-ction 77-3118, Utah Code Ann. (1953), which is the general statute
as to testimony of accO'mplices and the nee~ f,or corroboration of such testimony in order to support a conviction
is applicable in the instant case.
An examination of the testimony of four of the
State's five witnesses eonclusively establishes their individual and collective inability to place the defendant at
or even near the s·cene of the crime.
( 1) The victim, ~1rs. Edna Brennan, wrus asked
by the District Attorney, (Tr. 9)

"Did you see Mr. Bridge in your apartment
the night this happened~''
''No sir, I did not."
(2) }f r. McDonough, neighbor and friend of the
victim, w.ho came upon the sce:ne while the r·obbery was
in progress, was asked on cross-examination, (Tr. 12)
"Mr. McDonough, on the night of this event
you have just talked about, did you see the defendant?''
'' \Vho do you mean, please?''
''Stand up." (indicates defendant)
'' Oh, Mr. Bridge, no sir.''
''You didn't see that man~''
"No sir."
(3) Salt Lake Police Officer Dean Anderson merely
testified ahout finding a box allegedly containing certain
property stolen from Yl n.;. Edna Brennan and, in hi~
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testimony, did not even attempt to p1ace the defendant at
or near the scene of the crime. ( Tr. 23)
(4) .Salt Lake Police Officer Don PParson, who
investigated the robbery, was not able to place the
"defendant at or near the scene ·of the crime except b)'
reference t·o the ·statement made by the defendant and to
the introduction of which and the use of which as corroborating evidence (as well as the methods employed
in obtaining same), defense counsel interposed an objection, the denial of which forms the basis of this appeal.
(Tr. 15) (Tr. 39)

As a matter. of record, the accomplice, Milton B.
Head, who was convicted for his participation in the
crime at an earlier trial, was the only prosecution witness
who was able to place the defendant at or ne·ar the scene
of-the crime and to otherwise implicate him with participation therein, and to the testimony of this witness
defense eounsel also interposed objections. (Tr. 24) (Tr.
- 38) (Tr. 39)
It would appear beyond any shade of rebuttal that
the only corroborating evidence to the tHstimony of the
· witness, J\1ilton B. Head, was the confession or signed
statement of the defendant. Accordingly, it seems apparent that, if the' signed statement of the defendant was
inadmis'Sable, as urged by the defendant, then the requisites of Section 77-31-18, Utah Code Ann. (1953) were
not met and the conviction cannot stand.
In support of this contention, defendant urges upon
this Court that the constitutional factors herein involved
are determirtative, since, in essence, the admissabilit~·
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or non-admissability of defendant's statement depends {)n
constitutional interpretations and the practical application thereof, to-wit: was the "taking" of such a statement or confession by a police officer tantamount to a
denial of the rights of due process guaranteed by the
'Constitution of the State of Utah and the Constitution
of the United States when such "taking" diametrically
ignored and was in the face of the defendants repeated
requests for legal counsel before making any statements.
It is on this question and the related question of the
practical use made at the trial of such a signed statement
that defendants appeal is predicated.
Article 1, Section 12, Constitution ·of Utah provides:
''In criminal prosecuti-ons the accused shall
have the right to appe,ar and defend in person
and by counsel ... In no instance shall any a·ccused
person before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the right herein guaranteed ... "
·
The Statutes of F tah have extended the eonstitnticna1 guarantees implied and expressed in the abovequoted portions hy' providing, in Section 77-15-1, Utah
Code Ann. (1953):
"\Vhen the defendant is brought before the
magistrate upon an arrest ... the magistrate must
immediately inform him of the charg-e against
him and of his right to the aid of counsel in eve,ry
slrtpe of the proceedings." (Italics added)
\''.'hile it ma~' he contended that the wonls of the
Statute, as quo tell above, ''every· stage of the proceedin~·~,'' ~hould be judicially interpreted in their narrowest ~en,:e as applving only to formal court proceedings,
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~

such all intepretation, if
by thi>< Court, would
achieve only the questionable and undesirable result of
frustating and denying the Yery purposes of com;;ti-. {
tution~l and statutory guarantees for all the people and
would- set a penalty on ignorance and poverty and
suspicion. Can it rightly be 'maintained that procedural
due process is merely a pretty catch-word like a flowt>r
which- is exp~cted to nurture and grow on a rockbed of •
inquisition, coercion and pressure~ If its foundation
-is- rotten,· must not the house itself soon fall~ If the ·i
prisoner accused of a crime· is subjected to the infamies
of physical and mental torture, of solitary confinement,
of protracted ques-tioning •and cross-questi'oning, of softspoken. promises to "go easy" and "cooperation," then
do~s~ not. the-later observance of eonsti tu tional niceties at
for!llar -court· pr·oceedings, where statements obtained
'Yithnut _e':'ep. __ a mip.imum regard for legal standards of
decency:'and fairplay-are introduced, become_in reality a
_mer~-mockery of those guarantees neatly ea1culated to
_mask the earlier disregard for fundamental rights~

. The attention of the Court is respectfully invited
to the testimony of police officers Pearson, on cross:examination, {Tr. 17-22, incl.) In this exchange between
·the~ Witl1ess ana: defense counsel is s·et forth the whole
sordl{f s±or}/u( a- "polic~ po\ver" (and the exercise
ther~of-) -~~'lli~h :offends every cannon of decency and
f~irplay, and which certainly is considera:bly outside of
t_he a-rea of contemplation of the authors of the Statutes
ai1d Constitution- of- the ·state of Utah and the Nation.

"Uere js· the frank revelation, not unaccompanied with
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a certain degree of cynicism in the witnesseS; references
to "feeding time at the jail" and "time for me to go
off shift,'' of a young, inexperienced, poor, and hopeless
boy beilig questioned, questioned, and again questioned
about a serious crime-of repeated requests for_ legal
·counsel - of empty and vapid agreement with the
prisoners. requests by the police officer but without a ·
single effort to do something in compliance - of an
inevitable "breaking" by the prisoner and the "taking''
of a confession which eventually became the· one single
piece _of corroborating evidence which convicted the
defendant.
And it is just this situation, as revealed by the testimony of the prosecution witness which affords this Court
a golden opportunity_ to judicially uphold and re-affirm
its adherence to constitutional guarantees without which
this State and this Nation cannot long hope to survive.
Here are the crossroads where a clear cut and unimpeach- ·
able de<::ision must be reached, regardless of the ~ilt
or innocence of the individual who-se particular prohleJ!l
happens to be the medium b_y which the question 'has come
before this Court. Here is a parallel to the verysituation
which g·ave birth to those memorable lines written ·by
~Ir. J usti~e Frankfurter in SACHER vs. UNITED
STATES, 343 e.s. 1 -(1953):
'' . . . Bitfer experience has sharpened our
realization that ·a major test of a true democracy
is the fair administration of justice ... Time out
of mind this Court has rever'sed conviCJtion for
the most heinous offenses, even though no doubt
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about the guilt of the ·defendants was entertained. It reversed because the mode by which
guilt was established disregarded those standards
which are so p1recious and so improtant to our
society." (Italics added)
'The ·defendant urges upon the Court an acceptance
of a memorandum which was submitted to the Committee
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the United States by a Committee on the
Bill of Rights of the American Bar Association which,
in part, stated:
''A person accused of crime needs a lawyer .
right after his arrest more than at any other time
. . . investigation is made easier if the prisoner
is hidden away from lawyers who might advise
him of his rights with respect to interrog.ations
and confessions ... " (Italics added)
Reference is also n1ade to a comment by Dean Justin
Miller, (Duke University School of Law) one of the forem'Ost authorities in the field of criminal law, published in
the 20th Volume of the American Bar Association
Journal, page 77 ( 1934) :

" ... although 0ompetent counsel is of great
value at that time (time oftrial), the time when
an accused person really needs the help of a
lawyer is when he is first arrested and fr()m then
on until trial. The intervening period is so full
of hazards for the accused person that he may .
have lost any legitimate defens~ long ,before he
is arranged and put on trial.'' (Italics added)
The defendant submits to the Court that, the formal
wording of the Utah Constitution and its Statutes notwithstanding, he was denied effective counsel at the trial
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because of the events which preceded that trial. By
the time the trial stage wa;s reached the damage had
been done and no attorney, no matter how skilled,
could have overeome that damage. The confession of
the defendant. was obtained without the knowledg.e on
his part that it, as a single entity, would be the corroborating evidence necessary to convict him, a danger
which proper legal counsel, immediately after his arrest,
would have been able to bring to his attention after the
briefest discussion of the facts surrounding the commission of the crime. It would appear that this fact,
standing alone, would be more than sufficient to meet
the possible argument that a deprivation of due process,
in order to become the basis of appellate review, must
he seriously prejudicial to an appellant· in orde·r to
bring about a reversal. It is, however, submitted to
the Court that no such minute inspection of the degree
of prejudice arising from a denial of due prece·ss is
necessarv. In the words of l\Ir. Justice Murphy, speaking
in GL.\~SER vs. UXITED RTATES, 315 U.S. 60 (1942):
''To determine the precise degree of pre.judice ... is . :. difficult and unnecessary. Tlu'
ri,qltt to li(we assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absol1de to allow cowrts to indulge in
nice crtlc1dations as to the amount of prejudice
arising from its denial" ( Itralics added)
In -thP instant cac.:e there w<Jnld appear to be little
rpJP;-;tion as to the degree of_ material prejudi('P. suffered
by the defendant as- the result of the police officer's
tacit or impl;e(l refusal to take s_ome affirmative step
calcnlatwl to provide ('Ollll''el for:~the defendant, after
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the latters many requests, before continuing with the
questioning. The record of ·the trial provides ample proof
that a tired and worn out youngster, after having his
repeated requests for legal representation effectually
denied by his ques'tioners, finally broke down and said
(Tr. 19):
"Oh, 1 will give it to you, I guess it doesn't
make any difference.''
In that short, simple statement, this Court is presented with a graphic picture of what denial of counsel
''at every stage of the proceedings,'' as set forth in the
Statutes of Utah, really means. Surely it must pave
·been just such a realization which prompted Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, in. POWELL vs. ALABAMA, 287 U.S. 45
(1932) to write:
1

1

J
,
1

~

.;1
1

. '' ... he requires the guiding hand of counsel .,.
at every step in the proceedings against him.''
·
It will presumably be argu·ed that the safeguards
to human liberty enco·mpassed ~n the 14th ~mendment
to the Oonsti'tution of the United States are merely" generalities" established by the Congress of the "guidance" 1
of the several States and that the scope of interpretation
and application thereof by the individual State courts
is within the provi_nce of local .sovereignty. While th:re
unquestionably exists a certain degree of foundatwn ~·
for such a viewpoint, it ·would nevertheless appear that
the 14th Amendment imposes upon each State a duty to
follow its legislative, constitutional and statutory policy,
as set forth i~ its par'ticular laws and rules of procedure.
Within this category should lie the ·right of a prisoner to
have his requests for counsel honored-~---not after a case

4
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has been built up against him, but, as the Uta:h Statutes
require, at every stage of the proceedings, whic:h should
certainly include the interrogation stage. Any other
policy will inevitably lead to the very type ·of situation
which is before this Oourt now, where denial of counsel
has resulted in a prejudicial statement being taken from
a prisoner who was not made fully aware of its import
-and the use to which it would subsequently be put. For
this Court to subscribe to any other viewpoint would,
in effect, be to sanction an abridgement of its own standards of due process of law, as 'set forth in its own
Statutes and in complian~e with its own constitutional
requisites. It is respectfully submitted to the Court that,
"'hile the provisions of the 14th Amendment to the Con~titution of the Fnited States may be generalities, they
are nevertheless armed wi'~~h the authority and dignity
of purpose which demand adherence from the several
States. As to the applicability of those provisions to
the particular pro,blem presented by this appeal, e.i., a
denial of counsel by local police officials at the interrogation stage, the words of Judge Rutledge (later on the
henc:h of the Supreme Court of the United States), in his
cleci~ion froTYJ the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in \YOOD vs. UNITED STATES, 128 Fed. 2d,
~G5 (1942) ~aid:
·
'' ... the aid of counsel in preparation would
be farcical if the case could be fo,reclosed by pre! imina 1',1/ inquisition 1d1ich 1Nmld squeeze out conriction or prejudice lJ.lJ means unconstitutional, if
used at the trial ... tlw better and fairer practice
would be to provide eounsel for the accused before
permitting- him to speal even as a volunteer.''
(Italics added)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i2
It must necessarily be reiterated here that tlw
Statutes of Utah stand squa.rely behind the words of
Mr. Justice Sutherland and l\I r. Justice Rutledge !"ill<'<'
Section 77-15-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953) specifically
refers to,
" ... defendants rigbt to the aid of counsrl
at every stage of the proceedings." (I tal irs
added)

11

CONCLUSION
In view o.f 'the provisions of the 14th Amendment
to the ·constitution of the United States, the provisi·ons
of Article ·1, Section 12 of the Constitution of the State
of Utah, and the prnvisions of Secti·on 77-15-1, Utah
Code Ann. (1953), the appellant submits to the Court
'that the taking of his confession, despite his repeated
requests f.or legal counsel before making ·such a statPment, \vas a prejudicial violation of his rights to the
due proce-ss of law and that such a statement ;;.;hould
therefore not have been ·aceepted a:-: evidence hy thr Trial ,. ~
Court. If this be so, as· appellant contends, then, under ·~;:
the provisions of Section 77-31-18 Ptah Code Ann. (1953), ·
the statutory requisites of nroper corroboration for th<>
evidence given against a defendant hy an arromplicP
were not met, and his conviction ·should he reverse(].
respectfully suhmitten,
HERBERT TC. RLO~\XE
Attorney for Defendant.
65 East 4th South
Salt Lake Cit~', Ftah
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